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NOTES

PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING REFORM:
RENEWED INTEREST IN THE
COURTHOUSE, BUT WILL THE
STATEHOUSE FOLLOW SUIT?
The past two decades have proved turbulent for reformers
seeking the assistance of the judiciary in securing changes in public
school financing.1 During this time, federal and state courts have
evaluated the constitutionality of public education systems funded
primarily through local property tax assessments. 2 Opponents to
1 See Johnson, State Court Intervention in School FinanceReform, 28 CLEv. ST. L.
REV. 325, 337 (1979); Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional
Provisions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 VA. L. REV. 1639, 1642 (1989)
[hereinafter Note, To Render Them Safe]. Of the 24 state supreme courts to rule on the
constitutionality of property tax-based funding for public schools, 10 courts have found such
financing schemes unconstitutional and 14 have upheld them. Id.; see also Note, The School
Funding Challenge in Ohio: Board of Education v. Walter, 11 U. TOL. L. REV. 1019, 1024-34
(1980) [hereinafter Note, School Funding Challenge] (history of public school financing reform litigation through 1980).
2 See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 41 (1973); Shofstall v.
Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 90, 515 P.2d 590, 592 (1973); Dupree v. Alma School Dist. No. 30, 279
Ark. 340, 342, 651 S.W.2d 90, 92 (1983); Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 589, 487 P.2d 1241,
1243, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 603 (1971) (en banc) ("SerranoP'); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of
Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1010 (Colo. 1982); Horton v. Meskill, 195 Conn. 24, 31, 486 A.2d 1099,
1105 (1985); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 638-39, 285 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1981); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 794, 537 P.2d 635, 636 (1975); People ex rel. Jones v. Adams,
40 IM.App. 3d 189, 190-91, 350 N.E.2d 767, 769 (5th Dist. 1976); Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 228 (Ky. 1989); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ.,
Inc., 295 Md. 597, 637, 458 A.2d 758, 779 (1983); Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 391, 212
N.W.2d 711, 714 (1973); Helena Elementary School Dist. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 60, 784
P.2d 412, 412 (1990); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 337, 575 A.2d 359, 384 (1990); Robinson
v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 480, 303 A.2d 273, 281, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) ("Robinson
1'); Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d 27, 32, 439 N.E.2d 359, 364, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649
(1982); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 375-76, 390 N.E.2d 813, 820 (1979);
Fair School Fin. Council, Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1144 (Okla. 1987); Olsen v. State, 276
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property tax-based funding claimed that these systems resulted in
significant funding disparities between property-wealthy and property-poor school districts.' Relying on the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause,' the equal guaranty5 or education clauses6
Or. 9, 11, 554 P.2d 139, 140 (1976); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 418, 399 A.2d 360, 362
(1979); Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 348, 364 S.E.2d 470, 472 (1988);
Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. 1989); Seattle School
Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 526, 585 P.2d 71, 109 (1978); Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W.
Va. 672, 673-74, 255 S.E.2d 859, 864 (1979); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 471, 436
N.W.2d 568, 570 (1989); Washakie County School Dist. No. I v. Herschler, 606 P.2d 310, 319
(Wyo. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980).
Although local property taxes are the primary source of funds for public education,
states have recognized a need to alleviate some of the disparities through state aid funding.
See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, Educational Opportunity:A Workable ConstitutionalTest
for State Financial Structures, 57 CAiF. L. REv. 305, 312 (1969). Historically, three primary funding methods have been employed. Id. at 312-13.
Flat grants, the oldest and simplest form of state aid, are merely an absolute distribution of state funds to each district based upon a pre-determined unit, i.e. per pupil or per
teacher hired, but the ability of such a system to alleviate disparities is questionable. Id. at
313-14. A second method of distribution of state funds is the foundation plan in which the
state guarantees the district that if it will tax itself at a specified minimum rate, the state
will supplement the difference between the per pupil yield from the tax and a specified per
pupil guaranteed dollar amount. Id. at 314. While such a system may alleviate funding disparities to some extent, it does not eliminate the effect of wealth disparity. Id. Third, some
states utilize a combination of flat grants and foundation plans, which can take one of two
forms. Id. at 315. The flat grant can be added to the amount due the district from the
foundation plan thereby reducing disparities in an amount equal to the foundation plan
alone. Id. In the second approach, the flat grant is added to the amount yielded from the tax
in order to calculate the amount due under the foundation plan, and thus, this type of state
aid is counter equalizing since no benefit is given to the poor districts because they would
have received the same amount of state aid through the foundation plan if no flat grant
existed. Id.
' See Coons, Clune, & Sugarman, supra note 2, at 312-16; Note, To Render Them Safe,
supra note 1, at 1648-49 & n.37. All states, except Hawaii, fund their public school systems
through a combination of state and local funding, with much of the funding dependent upon
local revenue generated through property taxes. Coons, Clune & Sugarman, supra note 2.
This dependence on local property taxes results in gross disparities in available funds between property-wealthy and property-poor school districts. See id. at 317. In Texas, property wealth in the 100 wealthiest districts is more than 20 times greater than the average
property wealth of the 100 poorest districts, which results in an average of $2,000 more per
year available to each student in the wealthiest districts than to the students in the poorest
districts. Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392-93.
Another example can be found in New Jersey, where a district of 3,000 students classified as property-poor has a budget of $8.6 million while a property-wealthy district of 3,000
students has a budget of $12.1 million. Abbott, 119 N.J. at 335, 575 A.2d at 383. This also
equates to an approximate $2,000 per pupil disparity between the property-poor and property-wealthy districts. Id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 383-84.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The fourteenth amendment states, in pertinent part,
that "[n]o State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction equal protection of the
laws." Id.; see infra note 16 (discussion of two-tier test applying equal protection clause to
legislative acts).
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of state constitutions, or some combination of the three, propertypoor districts in twenty-four states challenged the constitutionality
of financing systems which had produced disparate public school
funding.7 These challenges met with varying degrees of success."
Until recently, the outlook for public school financing reform
through judicial intervention was uncertain at best.' However,
since February 1989, four of the five state high courts that addressed this issue struck down the school financing mechanism in
place in those states. 10 In light of these decisions, the movement
toward judicial intervention in public school financing reform litigation appears to be gaining momentum.1
' State "equal guaranty" clauses are clauses in state constitutions which explicitly provide for equal protection and which state high courts have interpreted as having similar
force and effect as the federal equal protection clause. See, e.g., Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 596
n.11, 487 P.2d at 1249 n.11, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 609 n.11 ("[w]e have construed these provisions
as 'substantially the equivalent' of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution"). See generally Williams, Equality Guaranteesin State
ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEx. L. REv. 1195, 1196-97 (1985) (detailed discussion of state court
interpretation of state equal guaranty clauses).
' State constitution "education clauses" as used in this Note refer to clauses found in
all state constitutions (except Mississippi) which command state legislatures to establish
some form of public education system. See generally,Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 Tax. L. REv. 777, 814-16 (1985)
(general discussion of state education clauses).
7 See supra note 2 (list of relevant decisions).
8 See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 313-15, 575 A.2d 359, 372-73 (1990). Courts in
Arizona, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New York, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have upheld local property tax-based funding as constitutional on both state equal guaranty and education clause
grounds. Id. at 314 n.5, 575 A.2d at 373 n.5. Courts in Kentucky, Montana, New Jersey,
Texas, Washington, and West Virginia struck down local property tax-based funding systems based on state education clause violations. Id. at 315 n.6, 575 A.2d at 373 n.6. Courts in
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, and Wyoming struck down local property tax-based
funding systems based on state equal guaranty violations. Id. at 315 n.7, 575 A.2d at 313 n.7.
9 See Note, To Render Them Safe, supra note 1, at 1641-42 nn. 12-16 (discussing inconsistency of outcomes in school finance reform litigation). An examination of the results
reveals that of the 19 state courts to address the issue prior to 1989, 13 challenges to the
existing financing schemes failed. See id.; see also Note, School Funding Challenge, supra
note 1, at 1034 ("[w]hat actually prompts a court to choose one of the above alternatives
may largely be a matter of conjecture").
10 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 211-12 (Ky. 1989) (striking down not only funding system but entire public education statutory structure); Helena
Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 55, 769 P.2d 684, 691 (1989) (funding
system unconstitutional); Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295, 575 A.2d at 363 (system held unconstitutional only as applied to poorer urban school districts); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 1989) (funding system unconstitutional); Kukor v. Grover,
148 Wis. 2d 469, 509-10, 436 N.W.2d 568, 585 (1989) (upheld existing funding system).
"' See Thro, The Third Wave: The Impact of the Montana, Kentucky, and Texas De-
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This Note will explore the current trend in public school financing reform litigation. Part One will trace the history of public
school financing litigation leading up to the recent successful challenges to local property tax-based funding. Part Two will discuss
the rationales of the four state courts which recently rejected property tax-based school funding 12 as violative of the education
clauses of their respective state constitutions. Part Two will also
note the similarities of these courts' decision-making processes
which may provide persuasive authority to courts considering this
issue in the future. Part Three will address the ultimate question
of whether this increased judicial activism will be met with the corresponding level of commitment on the part of state legislatures
that will be necessary to effectuate an actual improvement in the
quality of public education.
I.

AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCING
REFORM LITIGATION

In 1971, the California Supreme Court's decision in Serrano v.
Priest ("Serrano1,)13 was the first high state court ruling to recognize constitutional violations resulting from local property tax
based funding of public schools. 4 The plaintiffs in Serrano I arcisions on the Future of Public School FinanceReform Litigation, 19 J.L. & EDUC. 219, 222
(1990) (discussing education clauses of state constitutions).
12 For purposes of this Note, "trend cases," "trend decisions," and "trend courts" refer
to the four most recent cases striking down public school funding systems based on local
property taxes. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Helena, 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691;
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 399; Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 509-10, 436 N.W.2d at 585.
13 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971) (en banc) ("Serrano I"). The
Serrano I proceeding only addressed whether the allegations of the complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action. Id. at 591, 487 P.2d at 1245, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 605. The court
recognized that if the factual allegations of disparate funding were true, constitutional violations would exist. Id. at 617-18, 487 P.2d at 1265, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 625. The case was remanded for trial. Id. at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626. When the case reached
the California Supreme Court again in Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135
Cal. Rptr. 345 (1976) ("Serrano II"), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977), the local property
tax-based funding system was struck down. Id. at 775-77, 557 P.2d at 957-58, 135 Cal. Rptr.
at 373-74.
14 See Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 619, 487 P.2d at 1266, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626. While the
SerranoI decision marked the first time a court recognized that a disparate funding system
was unconstitutional, the first challenge to property taxed-based funding of public school
systems was brought in 1968 in McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.
1968), aff'd
sub nom. McInnis v. Oglive, 394 U.S. 322 (1969). Plaintiffs in Mclnnis premised their claim
on an "education needs" theory, suggesting that the fourteenth amendment required a
funding system which apportioned available funding based on educational needs of the students in a particular district. Id. at 331. In ruling that the fourteenth amendment was not
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gued that a financing system which causes disparities in expenditures among districts ultimately results in disparities in the quality
of educational opportunities provided in those districts. 15 Using
the United States Supreme Court's strict scrutiny test for measuring legislative acts against the equal protection clause,"6 the Serrano I court ruled that no compelling state interest was served by
a funding system which furthered such disparities." Thus, the
violated, the McInnis court relied on three rationales which would be echoed in future court
decisions: (1) the disbursement of educational funds was a legislative question; (2) even if
the constitution required funding to be related to educational needs, the lack of "discoverable and manageable standards" by which to measure the fulfillment of the constitutional
mandate renders the controversy non-justiciable; and (3) local control justifies a funding
system based largely on local property taxes. Id. at 333-37; see also Burruss v. Wilkerson,
310 F. Supp. 572, 574 (W.D. Va. 1969), (pre-SerranoI decision holding that legislature is
proper branch to evaluate these standards), aff'd, 397 U.S. 44 (1970). See generally Levin,
Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DUKE L.J.
1099, 1126-36 (1977) (discussing history of public school financing reform litigation through
1977).
See Serrano 1, 5 Cal. 3d at 590, 487 P.2d at 1244, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 604.
,e See J. NoWACK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.3, at 528-37 (3d

ed. 1986). In reviewing legislation under the equal protection clause, the Court has focused
on balancing the competing interests of constitutionally protected guaranties with the desire
to defer to legislative decisions. See id. at 529. Where the legislation has concerned economic or general social welfare, the Court has applied a "rational relation test." Id. at 52930. Where as here, the legislation affects "fundamental values," the Court has applied a
"strict scrutiny test." Id. The list of rights deemed fundamental by the Court has been
substantial. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974) (right to associate); U.S. v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973) (right to privacy in home); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972) (right to vote); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)
(right to procreate); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173 (1941) (right to travel).
Under strict scrutiny, the government must demonstrate a compelling interest justifying the necessity of classification. J. NOWACK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, § 14.3, at 530-31. The list of classifications deemed suspect is quite narrow, limited
only to race and alienage. See, e.g., Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 39-40 (1915) (alienage);
Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880) (race); see also City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (handicapped are quasi-suspect); Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723-27 (1982) (gender is quasi-suspect); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-51 (1979) (age is quasi-suspect).
" See Serrano I, 5 Cal. 3d at 597-617, 487 P.2d at 1250-64, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-24. The
court determined that the wealth based funding system created a suspect classification. Id.
at 597-603, 486 P.2d at 1250-54, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-14. Additionally, education was found
to be a fundamental right. Id. at 604-10, 486 P.2d at 1255-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 615-19. These
conclusions subjected the funding scheme to the strict scrutiny test whereby the defendants
were required to show a compelling state interest supporting the funding system. Id. at 61015, 487 P.2d at 1259-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-23. The compelling interest asserted by the
state, but ultimately rejected by the court, was the importance of local control over the
education in each district. Id. at 610, 487 P.2d at 1260, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 620. The court found
that the defendants failed in their burden and concluded that the funding system denied
equal protection to the plaintiffs and others similarly situated. Id. at 610-15, 487 P.2d at
1259-63, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 619-23.
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court concluded that the funding system violated both the fourteenth amendment equal protection clause and the California state
constitution's equal guaranty provisions."' This rationale established the foundation upon which future litigants challenged public
education financing systems on federal equal protection and state
equal guaranty grounds.19
However, the 1973 United States Supreme Court decision in
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez20 abruptly
terminated the viability of the federal equal protection challenge. 2 '
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez challenged the constitutionality of a
public school funding system which resulted in disparate funding
among property-wealthy and property-poor school districts on federal equal protection grounds.22 The Rodriguez court, like the Serrano I court, considered the strict scrutiny test in evaluating the
merits of the equal protection challenge.2 3 The Rodriguez Court,

however, concluded that wealth was not a suspect classification24
and that education was not a fundamental right protected by the
equal protection clause. 25 Thus, the propriety of the property taxbased funding system escaped rigorous strict scrutiny analysis and
survived the Court's review on a showing that the system was rationally related to the governmental interest in maintaining local
28 Id. California's equal guaranty provisions provide "[a]ll laws of a general nature shall
have a uniform operation" and "[n]o special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted
which may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature; nor shall any citizens, or

class of citizens, be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms shall not
be granted to all citizens." CAL. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21.
'9 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 345-50; Karst, Serrano v. Priest: A State Court's Responsibilities and Opportunities in the Development of Federal Constitutional Law, 60
CALIF. L. REv. 720, 722-25 (1972); Note, The Right to Quality Education: Serrano and its
Progeny, 2 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 44, 53-68 (1972).
20 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21 Id. The Rodriguez decision resulted in a "set-back" to the school reform movement
by initiating a "trend" of nonintervention in school financing matters. Johnson, supra note
1, at 331, 335-36.
22 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 5.
23 Id. at 34.
2, Id. at 28. From the evidence presented, the Court was unable to find discrimination
against any of the possible classes: (1) 'poor' persons whose incomes fall below some identifiable level of poverty or who might be characterized as functionally 'indigent,' or (2) those
who are relatively poorer than others, or (3) all those who, irrespective of their personal
incomes, happen to reside in relatively poorer school districts. Id. at 19-20.
25 See id. at 35. In determining whether education is a fundamental right, the Court
interpreted the Constitution to see if it was explicitly or implicitly guaranteed. Id. at 33-4.
The Court found that it was not. Id. at 35.
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control over public education.2 The Rodriguez decision foreshadowed three rationales which courts subsequently employed in upholding the constitutionality of property tax-based public school
funding: (1) equal protection guaranties do not extend to equal
educational funding; (2) judicially determinable standards do not
exist for assessing equality and adequacy of education; and (3) the
legislature is the proper institution to determine the adequacy of
education.
Thirteen days after the Rodriguez decision, the New Jersey
Supreme Court's decision in Robinson v. Cahill ("Robinson I1")28
provided reformers with arguably the most important decision supporting public school financing reform litigation.29 The Robinson
court was able to overcome the obstacle Rodriguez seemed to present by basing its decision on the education clause of the New
Jersey State Constitution, which mandates that the legislature provide a "thorough and efficient system of free public schools" 30 for
New Jersey children. 1 The court recognized "a significant connection between the sums expended and the quality of the educational
2 See id. at 44. Central to the Rodriguez finding that local control was a rational basis

supporting local property tax-based funding was the recognition that such a system offers
the opportunity for residents of the district to participate in the decision-making process of
how funds should be spent. Id. at 49-50. Plaintiff's argument, which the Court rejected, was
that property-tax based funding failed to promote local control in the property-poor districts by virtue of the lack of funds to be controlled. Id. at 50-51.
17 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 333 (acknowledged Rodriguez's rationales and recognized trend of nonintervention which followed Rodriguez).
28 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
29 See Thro, supra note 11, at 228 ("second wave" of public school financing reform
litigation attributed to Robinson 1). See generally Ruvoldt, EducationalFinancingin New
Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill and Beyond, 5 SETON HALL 1, 1-30 (1973) (analysis of Robinson I
decision by plaintiffs' attorney).
30 N.J. CONsT. art. IV, § 7.
31See Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 491, 303 A.2d at 294. The court declined to decide the
equal guaranty issue, choosing instead to decide the case on the merits of the education
clause challenge, stating "[m]echanical approaches to the delicate problem of judicial intervention under either the equal protection or the due process clauses may only divert a court
from the meritorious issue or delay consideration of it." Id. at 491-92, 303 A.2d at 282. The
court decided local property tax-based funding does not create a suspect classification based
on wealth. Id. at 493-94, 303 A.2d at 283. To so hold, the court stated, would implicate other
similarly funded governmental services. Id. The court found the fundamental right concept
was too nebulous to determine whether education was a fundamental right in New Jersey.
Id. at 498-99, 303 A.2d at 286. Such a finding, the court reasoned, would likewise implicate
other governmental services that the state is obligated to provide. Id. at 497, 303 A.2d at
284-85. Equally obscure was the determination of whether or not such a funding scheme
could be justified by a compelling state interest. Id. at 499, 303 A.2d at 286.
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opportunity." s2 Having acknowledged this relationship, the court
reasoned that New Jersey's property tax-based school funding system could not possibly satisfy the constitutional "thorough and efficient" mandate "unless we were to suppose the unlikely proposition that the lowest level of dollar performance happens to
coincide with the constitutional mandate and that all efforts beyond the lowest level are attributable to local decisions to do more
than the state was obliged to do."'3 3 The Robinson I court's reasoning provided the impetus for public school financing reform
through subsequent court challenges based on the education
clauses of state constitutions. 4
Since Robinson I was decided, twenty-two state courts of last
resort have debated the merits of the Serrano I, Rodriguez, and
Robinson I rationales.3 5 Four major decisions in 1989 and 1990 suggest a developing trend in the decision-making process.3 These recent "trend cases," which tend to disregard the equal guaranty
claims and focus instead on the state constitution education clause
challenges, indicate the emergence of a growing consensus in the
judiciary with regard to the issues raised in school financing reform
37
litigation.
Id. at 481, 303 A.2d at 277.
Id. at 516, 303 A.2d at 295. It is important to note that the Robinson I court decided
that the "thorough and efficient" mandate was not being satisfied solely on the basis of
evidence of disparate funding. See id. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295. The court recognized that
dollar input is "plainly relevant" and no other evidence was presented by which compliance
with the constitutional mandate could be measured. Id. at 515-16, 303 A.2d at 295-96. Many
post-Robinson I decisions rejected the presumption of a correlation between dollar input
and educational quality. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text (citing courts which
rejected correlation of dollars and quality).
The ability to produce evidence proving that dollar input is relevant to educational
opportunity would appear essential to a successful challenge. See infra notes 97-100 and
accompanying text (citing courts recognizing correlation of dollars and quality).
3, See Levin, supra note 14, at 1110 (discussing effect of Robinson I on future decisions); Note, supra note 19, at 53-58.
11 See Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 313-15, 575 A.2d 359, 372-73 (1990). A summary
of the results of all of the state courts addressing the issue of the constitutionality reveals
that prior to the 1989-90 decisions, 19 courts addressed the issue: three challenges succeeded
on equal guaranty grounds, three succeeded on education clause grounds, and 13 challenges
failed on both constitutional grounds. Id.; see also Ruvoldt, supra note 29, at 15-20 (detailed discussion of foundations established in Serrano I, Rodriguez, and Robinson 1).
" See Thro, supra note 11, at 221-22 (recognizing emergence of "new wave" in this
area).
37 Thro, supra note 11, at 221-22. The interpretation of state education clauses proffered in these recent decisions undoubtedly will be factored into future decisions on school
funding. Id. Although none of these interpretations are binding on other states, a failure of a
future court to consider the interpretations set forth in these decisions may tend to discredit
"
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CURRENT TREND IN PUBLIC SCHOOL
FINANCING REFORM LITIGATION

State Constitution Equal Guaranty Challenges

Courts have interpreted the equality provisions of their respective state constitutions to require a general protection of the
laws of the state." In determining whether the disparities resulting
from local property tax-based funding are violative of such provisions, state judges are free to interpret these provisions without
consideration of federal precedent, subject only to the requirement
that the interpretation does not contravene rights protected by the
federal Constitution."

Courts have adopted five distinct equal

guaranty analyses in public education funding suits.40 This diversity in approach is not surprising given the fact that state constitutions contain a variety of equality provisions which were "drafted
the legitimacy of the decision. Id. For instance, citizens would be unlikely to understand
why one state's "thorough and efficient" mandate means equal educational opportunity,
while in another state a similar clause demands only a minimum skills education. Id. It
seems reasonable that the courts will consider sister state interpretations for guidance subject to the specifics of the education system in the state and of the constitutional history
regarding the clauses. Id.
" See Williams, supra note 5, at 1196. For example, the New Jersey constitution's
equal guaranty provision states that "[a]lH persons are by nature free and independent, and
have natural and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life
and liberty, of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining
safety and happiness." N.J. CONsT. art. I, cl. 1.

3 See Sager, Foreword:State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and
Rules of ConstitutionalLaw, 63 Tax. L. REv. 959, 973-76 (1985).
40 See Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 775 557 P.2d 929, 957, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 373
(1976), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 907 (1977); Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359,
374-75 (1977); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 638, 285 S.E.2d 156, 159 (1981); Robinson
v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 480, 303 A.2d 273, 281, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973); Fair School
Fin. Council v. State, 746 P.2d 1135, 1144-47 (Okla. 1987); Note, To Render Them Safe,
supra note 1, at 1670-78. Although most courts apply the Supreme Court's strict scrutiny
test, they approach the determination of fundamental right in various ways. Id. at 1671. One
approach is to follow the Rodriguez method and determine that education per se is not a
fundamental right. Id. at 1672. A second approach, which purports to follow Rodriguez,
concludes that because the constitution explicitly provides an education clause, education is
a fundamental right under the state constitution. Id. at 1673-74. A third approach is a determination of whether the right is central to a representative form of government. Id. at
1675. The fourth test focuses on an historical analysis and determines whether education is
a fundamental right based upon the degree of emphasis the legislature has placed on education. Id. at 1676. A fifth approach is to reject Rodriguez altogether, and to declare a decision
without specifying any criteria. Id. The final approach is to reject the federal framework in
its entirety and establish an independent state framework. Id. at 1677-78.
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differently, adopted at different times, and aimed at different
evils."'"
In addition to this range in the interpretation of state equal
guaranty provisions, courts have cautioned that extending equal
protection guaranties to public school funding might also require
that such protection extend to all governmentally-provided services funded at the local level.42 For instance, the Rodriguez court
cautioned that if local property tax-based funding of public schools
were found to be unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it
could also implicate the funding of the local police and fire depart-

ments, health care and hospitals, and public utilities. 43 Similarly,

the New Jersey Supreme Court in Robinson I cautioned that "the
rudimentary scheme of local government . . . [would be] impli-

cated by the proposition that the equal protection clause dictates
statewide uniformity.

'44

It would appear that the combination of

the courts' divergent interpretations of equal guaranty clauses and
the concern that equal protection-based decisions on school financing issues could complicate other areas of local government has
prompted the courts to rely primarily on education clauses in
resolving public school financing reform disputes.
State Education Clauses

B.

While the equal guaranty provisions of the various state constitutions differ significantly, the education clauses in forty-nine
state constitutions mandating the establishment and maintenance
Williams, supra note 5, at 1196-97.
See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 803, 537 P.2d 635, 646 (1975) (cautioning ruling based on equal protection would implicate many local government entities
such as police and fire departments, judiciary, road departments); Robinson 1, 62 N.J. 473,
498-99, 303 A.2d 273, 284-85 (expressing concern about implication for other government
units with fiscal control responsibility).
See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 54.
"
Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 482, 303 A.2d at 277. Courts in the past also have concluded
that general state equal guaranty provisions do not require statewide uniformity in all situations to which they are applied. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 147 (1971). In James,
the court rejected plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to a state constitutional provision
requiring approval by a majority of the voting community for developing, constructing, or
acquiring low-rent housing projects, stating that the equal protection clause does not contemplate requiring mandatory referendums in all situations. Id.; West Morris Bd. of Educ.
v. Sills, 58 N.J. 464, 477, 279 A.2d 609, 616, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 986 (1971). In Sills, the
plaintiffs attacked the constitutionality of a state statute providing free transportation of
children to private schools on equal protection grounds, and the court responded "[i]f the
subject is appropriate for local preference or decision, a statute may provide for local option
or referendum." Id.
4

41
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of public schools fall neatly into four categories.4 Each category
requires an incrementally stronger commitment by the legislature
46
to education.
The education clauses at issue in the four recent trend cases
fall within the category of clauses which imposes the second least
stringent obligation. 47 Because thirty-five states require a similar
or stronger degree of legislative commitment,48 courts yet to address public school funding challenges under state education
clauses are likely to follow the direction of the trend decisions.
In interpreting education clauses, courts essentially have
reached one of two conclusions. Some courts have concluded that
the education clause in question mandates substantial equality of
educational opportunity, thus requiring equality in available funding.49 Other courts have concluded that the education clause at issue mandates only a minimum or basic level of education.5 0 In
45

See Ratner, supra note 6, at 814-16.

46

See id. The first group requires a general commitment to providing education. Id. at

815. For instance, the Connecticut constitution states "[tihere shall always be free public
elementary and secondary schools in the state." CONN. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1. The second
group emphasizes the quality of the education, such as requiring that the "Legislature shall
provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public
schools for the instruction of all children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen
years." N.J. CONsT. art. VIII, § 4. The provisions in the third group are stronger and more
explicit. For instance, the Rhode Island Constitution mandates the legislature "to promote
public schools and to adopt all means which it may deem necessary and proper to secure
. . . the advantages.., of education." R.I. CONST. art. XII, § 1. The strongest commitment
is exemplified by the fourth group, as evidenced in the Washington Constitution which
states "[it is the paramount duty of the State to make ample provision for the education of
all children residing within its border .... ." WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
47 See Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 205 (Ky. 1989) (Kentucky
Constitution mandates the legislature provide "efficient system of common schools throughout the state"); Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 52, 769 P.2d
684, 689 (1989) (Montana Constitution requires legislature to provide system of "free quality public elementary and secondary schools"); Abbott v. Burke, 119 N.J. 287, 295, 575 A.2d
359, 363 (1990) (New Jersey Constitution requires legislature to maintain and support "a
thorough and efficient system of free public schools"); Edgewood Indep. School Dist. v.
Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1989) (Texas Constitution requires legislature to provide
efficient system of common schools).
8 See Ratner, supra note 6, at 814-16 nn.164-66.
40 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211 (requiring system to be adequately funded, substantially uniform, and provide each child with equal opportunity to education); Helena,
236 Mont. at 54, 769 P.2d at 691 (financing is one aspect of equal educational opportunity);
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 388, 575 A.2d at 409 (remedy requires poorer districts have per pupil
budget approximately equal to richer districts); Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397 ("districts
must have substantially equal access to similar revenue per pupil at similar levels of tax
effort").
50 See, e.g., Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 809, 537 P.2d 635, 652 (1975) (gen-
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reaching these conclusions, courts repeatedly have encountered
three issues in their decision-making processes, each of which is
discussed below: (1) the existence of judicially-determinable standards, including a determination of whether the judiciary, or the
legislature, is the proper branch of government to evaluate the
standards;5 (2) a determination of the framers' purpose in drafting
the clause; 52 and (3) the weight and validity of the evidence in establishing that the constitutional mandate has or has not been satisfied. 3 The similarities in the rationales of the four trend courts
suggest a developing uniformity in the judiciary's analyses of state
constitution education clauses.
1.

Do Judicially-Determinable Standards Exist?

The existence of judicially-determinable standards against
which to measure the equality and adequacy of education has perplexed courts since the inception of public school financing reform
litigation. 4 Courts concluding that such standards do not exist
have reasoned that the legislature is the proper governmental unit
to evaluate efficiency, thoroughness, adequacy, or other mandated
level of educational equality. 5
Although the determination of measurable standards has been
eral and uniform requires "every child . .. [to have] free access to certain minimum and
reasonably standardized educational and instructional facilities and opportunities"); Board
of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 386-87, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825-26 (1979) (failure to
satisfy "thorough and efficient" standards would require school district so "starved for
funds" that children would be totally deprived of educational opportunity), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 498, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577-78 (1989)
(satisfaction of general and uniform mandate required meeting standards for teacher certification, minimal number of school days, and standard school curriculum).
See infra notes 54-68 and accompanying text.
62 See infra notes 69-93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36-37 ("logical limitations" exist to plaintiff's argument, such as difficulty in distinguishing education from effects of adequate food and shelter); McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 335 (1968) (controversy not justiciable due to
lack of "discoverable and manageable standards"); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 424, 399
A.2d 360, 366 (1979) (recognizing only possible judicially manageable standard would be
requiring equal expenditures per pupil and that expenditures alone are not proper measure
of educational quality).
66 See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 42 (cautioning against interference in area where Court
lacks knowledge and experienced decisionmakers at state and local levels); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005, 1018-19 (Colo. 1982) (recognizing judicial intrusion
should be avoided in controversial areas); McDaniel v. Thomas, 248 Ga. 632, 644, 255 S.E.2d
156, 165 (1981)(noting difficulty in establishing "judicially manageable standards for determining whether or not pupils are being provided 'an adequate education' ").
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questioned, the recent trend decisions support the argument that
these clauses do provide standards and that it is specifically the
duty of the judiciary to evaluate whether the legislature has fulfilled its constitutional obligation to ensure that those standards
are satisfied.5 6 For instance, in Edgewood Independent School District v. Kirby,57 the Texas Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of constitutional standards inherent in the clause mandating
that "the legislature must make 'suitable' provision for an 'efficient' system for the 'essential' purpose of a 'general diffusion of
knowledge.'"58 While recognizing that these terms are not exact,
the court stressed its duty to measure the constitutionality of legislative acts despite a lack of precision in the standards to be evaluated.59 Similarly, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in Abbott v.
Burke,60 recognized the standard of "thorough and efficient" as
necessarily general, but concluded that standards did exist against
which to measure educational opportunity.6 1 In Rose v. Council for
Better Education,Inc.,6 2 the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded
that it is the duty of the judiciary, not the legislature, to determine
what is constitutional. 3 Failure of the court to decide this constitutional issue would be a "denigration of [its] own constitutional
4
duty."'
Judicially-determinable standards established by education
clauses are also acknowledged by those courts which have upheld
property tax-based funding systems. These courts have concluded
that the applicable standard is a minimum or basic education. 5

6

See, e.g., Helena Elementary School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 236 Mont. 44, 55, 769 P.2d
684, 690 (1989) (court did not address existence of determinable standards, but its conclusion that constitutional mandate had not been satisfied supports proposition that standards
exist); Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 496, 585 P.2d 71, 83-84 (1978)
("ultimate power to interpret, construe and enforce the constitution of this State belongs to

the judiciary").
11 777 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. 1989).
Is Id. at 394.
" See id.
0 119 N.J. 287, 575 A.2d 359 (1990).

61See id. at 316, 575 A.2d at 374.
82

790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).

63 See
64 Id.

id. at 209.

5 See Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis. 2d 469, 498, 436 N.W.2d 568, 577-78 (1989). This
recognition of judicially determinable standards by courts upholding local property taxbased funding systems is not a new phenomenon. See Board of Educ. v. Nyquist, 57 N.Y.2d
27, 38, 439 N.E.2d 359, 363, 453 N.Y.S.2d 643, 648 (1982) (difficulty in fashioning remedy

not dispositive of judicial activism or abstention); Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d
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For example, in the most recent decision upholding a local property tax-based funding system, Kukor v. Grover,6 6 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court determined that compliance with the uniformity
provision could be measured in terms of "minimum standards for
teacher certification, minimal number of school days, and standard
school curriculum. '6 7 At this point in the decision-making process,
courts following both lines of reasoning are in general agreement as
to the existence of judicially manageable standards by which to
evaluate the constitutional mandate."' The first point of divergence
occurs in the interpretation of the education clauses.
2.

The Interpretation Process

Many courts addressing the issue of local property tax-based
funding consider the plain meaning of the constitutional language
in conjunction with its history in attempting to identify the intentions of the framers' specific mandate that the legislature provide
for public education.6 9 Courts have developed two distinct interpretations of education clauses.
Those courts which have concluded that the obligation mandates the providing of a minimum or basic education have concentrated on historical evidence which suggests that the framers supported local property tax-based funding and the local control of
education which it promotes.7 0 Although sometimes acknowledging
368, 383, 390 N.E.2d 813, 823 (1979) (emphasizing authority and duty of court to review
constitutionality of legislation and declare unconstitutional statutes inoperative), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
66 148 Wis. 2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989).
67 See id. at 492-94, 436 N.W.2d at 577-78.
6 See Johnson, supra note 1, at 337 (recognizing state courts have adamantly asserted
authority to review constitutionality of education mandates).
66 See, e.g., Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 618, 458 A.2d 758,
770 (1983) (recognizing ambiguity in provision, court required determination of framers' intent); Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 802, 537 P.2d 635, 645-48 (1975) (discussing
history of constitution).
70 See, e.g., Thompson, 96 Idaho at 805, 537 P.2d at 647 ("history of our constitutional
convention does not support the conclusion that the delegates were opposed to local taxation for raising the necessary revenue for local public schools"); Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 625,
458 A.2d at 773 (history of constitutional convention reveals delegates expressed support for
local control); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 427, 399 A.2d 360, 367 (1979) (recognizing
history supports local tax revenues as major source of Pennsylvania's school financing).
Upon recognizing concern over local control, courts defer to the legislature's wisdom in
implementing a system providing a minimum level of education to all students. See, e.g.,
Thompson, 96 Idaho at 806, 537 P.2d at 649 (legislature has primary and fundamental duty
to establish and maintain public education system); Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 631, 458 A.2d at
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the framers' concern over the importance of education for societal
welfare, these courts generally have concluded that the framers intended the ultimate determination of the funding method to be a
matter of legislative discretion, and have recognized that local control through local funding is an important aspect of that funding
scheme. 1 Subject to the caveat that no district is "starved for
funds

17

2

and some minimum level of education is provided to stu-

dents, local property tax-based funding systems have been found
constitutional when historical evidence is interpreted as revealing
such intentions. 3
Other courts, concluding that the mandated obligation is
equality of educational opportunity, have concentrated on historical evidence suggesting that the framers' primary concern was providing quality education to all children of the state.74 The four recent trend decisions provide renewed emphasis on this focus.
These courts typically have based their reasoning on the tenet
that the "Constitution was ratified to function as an organic document to govern society and institutions as they evolve through
time.

1

5

The well settled rules of constitutional construction re-

776 (development of education system is matter for legislature); Board of Educ. v. Walter,
58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 385, 390 N.E.2d 813, 824 (1979) ("judicial department... should exercise great circumspection before declaring public school legislation unconstitutional"), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
71 See Note, School Funding Challenge, supra note 1, at 1040 (acknowledging importance of local control in school financing reform litigation but discussing flaws of Walter).
72 See Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 388, 390 N.E.2d at 825-26.
7 See, e.g., Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 623-26, 458 A.2d at 772-74 (discussing change from
"uniform" mandate to "thorough and efficient" mandate, court stressed framers' emphasis
on local control and deference granted to legislature in implementing details); Walter, 58
Ohio St. 2d at 377, 390 N.E.2d at 820 (noting historic reliance and acceptance of local property taxes as means of financing public education); Danson, 484 Pa. at 427, 399 A.2d at 367
(concluding framers endorsed local control concept to meet diverse local needs).
71 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 207; Helena, 236 Mont. at 52-53, 769 P.2d at 689; Abbott,
119 N.J. at 303-15, 575 A.2d at 367-73; Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394-95.
75 See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394. The Edgewood court stated:
If our state's population had grown at the same rate in each district and if the
taxable wealth in each district had also grown at the same rate, efficiency could
probably have been maintained within the structure of the present system. That
did not happen. Wealth, in its many forms, has not appeared with geographic
symmetry. The economic development of the state has not been uniform. Some
cities have grown dramatically, while their sister communities have remained
static or have shrunk. Formulas that once fit have been knocked askew. Although
local conditions vary, the constitutionally imposed state responsibility for an efficient education system is the same for all citizens regardless of where they live.
Id. at 396.
The New Jersey Supreme Court also recognized that legislative history indicated "a
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quire courts first to determine if the language of a provision is
clear and unambiguous."" Although many courts find the education
clauses ambiguous, 7 7 the Montana Supreme Court in Helena Elementary School District No. 1 v. State8 relied solely on the plain
meaning of the provision, "[e]quality of educational opportunity is
guaranteed to each person of the state '7 9 to determine whether the
intent of the framers was to provide equal educational opportunity.8 0 However, because most of the mandates are not as clearly
articulated,"' courts must examine legislative history to determine
the framers' intent.8 2
Primary sources of information reflecting the intent of the
framers are the constitutional debates and commentaries preceding
the enactment of the provisions. 83 For instance, the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded in Rose v. Council for Better Education4
that these debates revealed the goal of valuable and effective education for all children and emphasized the importance of education
to the welfare of the commonwealth. 5 The Texas Supreme Court's
examination of the constitutional convention which enacted the
Texas education clause revealed prevailing sentiments "on the importance of education for all the people of [the] state, rich and
perceptive recognition on the part of the Legislature of the constantly evolving nature of the
concept being considered." Abbott, 119 N.J. at 303, 575 A.2d at 367. The Kentucky Supreme
Court determined that the directive of the constitution was that the legislature not only
establish a system, but ensure that it will always be maintained in a constitutional manner.
See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 211. Thus, the Kentucky Supreme Court also recognized the need
to evaluate the satisfaction of the mandate in relation to current societal conditions. Id.
7' See American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 68 (1982); United States v.
Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560 (1982); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917).
7 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 205 (clear it is sole obligation of legislature to provide educational system, but interpretation of "efficient" requires study and analysis); Edgewood,
777 S.W.2d at 394 (term "efficient" is not precise); Kukor, 148 Wis. 2d at 485, 436 N.W.2d
at 574 ("what the framers intended by the phrase 'as nearly uniform as practicable' is not
evident from the plain meaning of these words").
786236 Mont. 44, 769 P.2d 684 (1989).
71 MONT. CONST. art. X, § 1, cl.1.
"' See Helena, 236 Mont. at 52-53, 769 P.2d at 689.
81 See Ratner, supra note 6, at 822 (state constitution education provisions can generally be interpreted as establishing duty to educate effectively but "language of these provisions is so vague no single interpretation is mandated").
82 See Cass v. United States, 417 U.S. 72, 83 (1974); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940).
83 See infra note 90 and accompanying text (discussing, in detail, history of provisions
in trend decisions).
84 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky. 1989).
88 See id. at 206.
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poor alike."' 6 The New Jersey Supreme Court in Abbott v. Burke
relied primarily on the Robinson I court's determination that the
framers intended to provide each child with the opportunity to
function as a citizen and competitor in the labor market.8 7 The
Robinson I court considered the history of public education in New
Jersey in relation to the constitutional amendment providing for
the appropriation of state funds to public schools." The court reasoned that the history of this amendment revealed the intention
that as "a matter of equity.., the expenses incurred in maintaining the schools needed to impart this education, shall be borne by
all alike."8' 9 Considering the interpreted purposes, legal precedent,
persuasive authority, or some combination of the three, these four
courts linked the concepts of "efficient," "thorough," and "uni90
form" to educational equality.
86 See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 395.
'T See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 313, 575 A.2d at 372. The Robinson I decision determined
that "thorough and efficient" education was "that educational opportunity which is needed
. . .to equip a child for his role as a citizen and as a competitor in the labor market." Id.
(quoting Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 515, 303 A.2d at 295).
88 See Robinson I, 62 N.J. at 505-13, 303 A.2d at 288-95. The State School Fund had
been used to support New Jersey schools since 1829. Id. at 506, 303 A.2d at 290. The 1844
constitution required that the income in the fund be appropriated "for the equal benefit of
all the people of the state." Id. (quoting N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 7, cl. 6 (1844)). From this
there emerged a system partially funded through state funds and partially through local
taxation. Id. at 506, 303 A.2d at 290. An 1871 statute provided for free public schools in the
state. Id. at 507, 303 A.2d at 291. In 1875, the constitution was amended to provide for
"thorough and efficient" education. Id. Following the enactment of the "thorough and efficient" provision, the 1881 State Superintendent's report revealed the intended equity in the
tax burden resulting from the maintenance of the public school system. Id. at 511, 303 A.2d
at 292.
81See id. at 293.
90 See, e.g., Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 394-96. The court first determined the framers'
intended use of the word "efficient." See id. at 395. Journals from the constitutional convention revealed that the framers chose the word "efficient" to describe the manner in which
the educational system would be established. Id. "Efficient" was then defined as producing
an intended effect with little waste. See id. Recognizing that the delegates spoke at great
lengths about the importance of education for all people in the state and that the financing
structure in place at the time of ratification indicated that the constitution provided a system calling for an equal taxation burden, the court concluded gross disparities in funding
were "directly contrary to the constitutional vision of efficiency." See id. at 396. Additionally, the court considered legal precedent and legislative studies recognizing the link between efficiency and equality to buttress its reasoning. See id. at 397. The court quoted from
Mumme v. Mars, 120 Tex. 383, 397, 40 S.W.2d 31, 37 (1931), for its finding that these appropriations "have a real relationship to the subject of equalizing educational opportunities
in the state, and tend to make our system more efficient .... ." Id.
The Kentucky Supreme Court, guided by the framers' expressed purpose, examined
legal precedent, case law from other state courts, and expert opinions to link efficiency to
equality. See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 206-11. Legal precedent in Kentucky revealed the follow-
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The Texas and Kentucky Supreme Courts addressed evidence
suggesting that the framers were interested in establishing a specific funding system which relied on local property tax-based funding and left the question of funding to the discretion of the legislature."1 These courts concluded that this evidence reflected a belief
that although such funding methods may once have been an acceptable and desirable means to achieve the goal of equal educational opportunity, the framers' primary focus was on the intended
quality of education and not on the intended methods of funding.9"
ing conclusions: (1) The legislature is required to create and maintain a statewide system of
common schools; (2) this service is vital and critical to the state's well-being; (3) the common school system must be efficient, free, and provide equal educational opportunities for
all students; (4) the state must regulate and execute the system; (5) the system must be, "if
not uniform, 'substantially uniform,' with respect to the state as a whole"; and (6) the system must be equal with respect to all students. Id. at 208.
The court supported its conclusion with the West Virginia Supreme Court's decision in
Pauley v. Kelly, 162 W. Va. 672, 255 S.E.2d 859 (1979). Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 209. The
Pauley court similarly defined the standard of "thorough and efficient" by relying on a
"plethora of legal precedent" and legislative history. See id. at 210. The court also considered opinions of experienced and well-qualified teachers, educators, and administrators in
defining "efficient." See id. at 210-11. Using this information, the court determined that
among the fundamental elements of an efficient school system was equal educational opportunity for all students. See id. at 212-13.
The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on the interpretation of "thorough and efficient,"
which flowed from the Robinson series of litigation, and on other legal precedent linking
efficiency to equality, concluding that the mandate required equal educational opportunity.
See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 303-15, 575 A.2d at 367-73. The court pointed out that the New
Jersey Supreme Court's first interpretation of the "thorough and efficient" clause in Landis
v. Ashworth, 57 N.J.L. 509, 31 A. 1017 (Sup. Ct. 1895), "was permeated by the concept of
equality." Id. at 304, 575 A.2d at 367. The court in Robinson I determined, on the basis of
disparate funding per pupil, that the state had not satisfied the constitutional mandate of a
"thorough and efficient" education. Id. at 303, 575 A.2d at 368. However, in devising a remedy, the focus in Robinson I was not on equal expenditures but on requiring a minimum
level of substantive education to "equip the student to become 'a citizen and ...a competitor in the labor market.'" Id. at 306, 575 A.2d at 369 (quoting Robinson I, 62 N.J. 473, 515,
303 A.2d 273, 295, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)). In Abbott, the court determined that
the required level of substantive education should be such that the "poorer disadvantaged
students must be given a chance to be able to compete with relatively advantaged students."
Id. at 313, 575 A.2d at 372. Given the abundance of evidence presented, the court concluded
that gross disparity in funding impeded the opportunity for equal competition among the
poorer and wealthier districts. Id. at 394, 575 A.2d at 412.
01 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208-09; Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396-97.
92 See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In answer to the state's argument that the
constitution expressly authorized the current financing system, the court concluded that
"this provision was intended not to preclude an efficient system but to serve as a vehicle for
injecting more money into an efficient system." See Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 396. It would
seem that this answer indicates the court found that the framers were more concerned with
achieving the goal of efficient education than authorizing a specific means of achieving it.
The opposing argument in Rose focused on legal precedent suggesting that the constitu-
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Thus, when the mandated obligation to equal education has not
been satisfied, the intended quality of education takes precedence
over the intended funding method and, consequently, the deference traditionally granted to the legislature in this area."
It is suggested that whether or not courts decide that similar
clauses mandate equal educational opportunity or a minimum basic education, courts must evaluate the evidence in light of the interpretation of the imposed obligation.
3.

Sufficiency of the Evidence

The nature and extent of the evidence presented in the recent
trend cases indicates that any successful challenge to the constitutionality of local property tax-based funding must present abundant and reliable evidence proving that dollars do, in fact, make a
difference in educational quality.9 4 The failure to provide evidence
proving a correlation between funds expended and the quality of
education provided was a common rationale cited by courts for up95
holding the constitutionality of local property tax-based funding.
tional mandate to provide an efficient system of schools provided the legislature with the
"sole and exclusive authority" to achieve this end. Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 208. The court recognized that precedent granted much discretion to the legislature in such matters, but it remained a function of the judiciary to determine whether the legislature was satisfying the
mandate. See id. at 209. Ultimately the court found the primary issue to be whether the
system actually achieved the qualitative goals revealed by the legislative history. Id.
11 See supra note 90. This conclusion by the trend courts is in accord with similar
conclusions in prior decisions. See, e.g., Pauley, 162 W. Va. at 684-86, 255 S.E.2d at 870
("thorough and efficient" standard vested operation of school system in hands of legislature
subject to "unreasonableness"). The tenor of the discussions at the constitutional debates
reveals that excellence was the goal of the framers. Id. at 687-88, 255 S.E.2d at 868-69. The
court determined that such a goal required a school system which "develops, as best the
state of education expertise allows, the minds, bodies and social morality of its charges toprepare them for useful and happy occupations, recreation and citizenship, and does so economically." Id. at 705, 255 S.E.2d at 877. While recognizing the deference granted to the
legislature in determining the means to achieve this goal, id. at 707, 255 S.E.2d at 878, the
court concluded that ultimately the legislature must satisfy the goal of excellence set forth
by the constitutional mandate. Id.
" See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196-97. The evidence consisted of "numerous depositions,
volumes of oral evidence heard by the trial court, and a seemingly endless amount of statistical data, reports, etc.... [t]he overall effect of ... [which] is a virtual concession that
Kentucky's system of common schools is underfunded and inadequate." Id.; see also Helena, 236 Mont. at 47, 53-54, 769 P.2d at 686, 690 ("six-week long trial included extensive
evidence and testimony... clearly and unequivocally establish[ing] large differences ... in
per pupil spending among the various school districts of Montana"); Abbott, 119 N.J. at 295,
575 A.2d at 363 ("the evidence compels but one conclusion: the poorer the district and the
greater its need, the less money available, and the worse the education").
" See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 36 ("[e]ven if it were conceded that some identifiable
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Stating that the plaintiffs presented no claim or evidence proving
they were disadvantaged by the disparate funding, many courts
reasoned that evidence of funding disparity alone was not proof of
a failure by the legislature to satisfy its constitutional mandate."8
However, an examination of the recent trend decisions reveals
records replete with evidence indicating that the amount of funding does make a difference in the quality of education.9 7 The Kentucky Supreme Court, in Rose v. Council for Better Education,
Inc., characterized the evidence presented by the plaintiffs as a
"tidal wave" which "literally engulfs" evidence presented by the
defendants. 8 The New Jersey Supreme Court, in Abbott v. Burke,
commented that "[v]ery few of the cases have a factual record that
even begins to approach that before us."9' However, whatever the
quantum of education is a constitutionally protected prerequisite ... we have no indication
that the present levels of educational expenditure in Texas provide an education that falls
short"); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 638, 458 A.2d 758, 780
(1983) ("[n]o evidentiary showing was made ... that these qualitative standards were not
being met in any school district, or that [the] financing scheme did not provide all school
districts with the means essential to provide [adequate] education"); Milliken v. Green, 390
Mich. 389, 391 n.2, 404, 212 N.W.2d 711, 712 n.2, 718-19 (1973) (no concrete claim that
students are suffering from educational inadequacies because of deficient financing system);
Board of Educ. v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 387-88, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (1979) (no proof
any district was receiving so little funding that it was deprived of educational opportunity),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 424, 399 A.2d 360, 365
(1979) (appellant failed to allege that legal harm was suffered from projected financial
deficit).
It is interesting to note that the evidence presented at trial in Walter showed "fourteen
percent of the schools in Ohio had inadequate pupil-teacher ratios under law, fifty-three
percent of the schools were found to be deficient in curriculum and instruction, at least
thirty-one percent of the buildings lacked adequate classrooms, libraries, art, music or physical education facilities, and fifty four percent had inadequate textbooks," yet the Ohio Supreme Court found that a minimum acceptable education was being provided. See Note,
School Funding Challenge, supra note 1, at 1040-41.
11 See, e.g., Hornbeck, 295 Md. at 638, 458 A.2d at 780 (less than adequate education is
a prerequisite to judicial intervention); Milliken, 390 Mich. at 409, 212 N.W.2d at 721 (legislature not required to equalize spending by either forcing reduced spending in affluent areas
or contributing to depressed areas); Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d at 387, 390 N.E.2d at 825 ("thorough and efficient" standard breached solely when student deprived of "educational opportunity"); Danson, 484 Pa. at 427-28, 399 A.2d at 367 ("thorough and efficient" standard does
not require uniform spending).
91 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 196-99; Helena, 236 Mont. at 48-50, 769 P.2d at 686-87;
Abbott, 119 N.J. at 362-77, 575 A.2d at 397-404; Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 392-93.
" See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197-98. The Rose court noted inadequacies in educational
opportunities including differences in curricula, achievement test scores, teacher salary, provisions of basic educational materials, student-teacher ratios, quality of basic management,
size, adequacy, condition of school physical plants, and per annum expenditures per student. Id.
" See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 315, 575 A.2d at 373. The court described the level of educa-
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characterization, the outcome hinged on the ability of the plaintiffs
to employ "[u]niform testimony of the expert witnesses at trial,
corroborated by data, [to show] a definite correlation between the
money spent per child on education and the quality of the education received."10 0
III.

WILL JUDICIAL ACTIVISM EFFECTUATE CHANGE IN
EDUCATIONAL QUALITY?

The judicial activism practiced by the trend courts raises the
question: Will the decisions of these courts lead to new constitutionally sound funding systems, resulting in higher quality public
education? 0 1 The application of these judicially imposed remedies
tion offered to some students in the poorer districts as tragically low. See id. at 359, 575
A.2d at 395. The evidence indicated disparities in exposure to computers, in the availability
and quality of laboratories for science programs, in the availability of foreign language programs, the quality of music, art, and physical education programs, and physical facilities. Id.
at 359-63, 575 A.2d at 395-99. The plaintiffs also offered other indicators such as teacherstudent ratios, and the average experience and average level of education of instructional
staff. Id. at 366, 575 A.2d at 399. This evidence established the relationship between funding
and quality of education. Id. at 367, 575 A.2d at 399.
100 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 197-98. "Students in property-poor districts receive inadequate and inferior educational opportunities as compared to those offered to those students
in the more affluent districts." Id.; Helena, 236 Mont. at 55-56, 769 P.2d at 690 (evidence
showed unequal educational opportunities were result of spending disparities); Edgewood,
777 S.W.2d at 393 (differences in quality of educational programs dramatic). But see Abbott, 119 N.J. at 336-37, 575 A.2d at 384 (evidence insufficient to prove deficiency on statewide basis).
lox An analogy to the history of judicial activism in the area of civil rights lends support
to the idea that judicial decisions alone will not effectuate change. For instance, the Reverend Theodore M.,Hesburgh, one of the six members of the 1957 United States Commission
on Civil Rights appointed by President Eisenhower, recognized the limits of legal actions
and the need for "creative leadership from every segment of American society" in order to
provide equality to all races, colors, nationalities, religions, cultures, and classes. See Hesburgh, The End of Apartheid in America, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 244, 251-52 (1986). The
desegregation aspect of the civil rights movement provides a particularly useful analogy in
predicting that the success of these judicial decisions will depend upon legislative and societal responses. See Comment, Jenkins v. Missouri: The Future of InterdistrictSchool Desegregation, 76 GEo. L.J. 1867, 1870 (1988). Brown v. Topeka Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493
(1954), was the landmark decision finding a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment arising from state laws and constitutional provisions providing for
racial segregation in public schools. See id. at 495. Subsequent to this decision, which required federal courts to "correct past violations with equitable remedies 'with all deliberate
speed,'" the Brown commands "remained hollow principles for nearly a decade." See Comment, supra, at 1870.
Throughout the period following Brown, courts were forced to take a stronger position
to ensure the enforcement of the Brown commands. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 6 (1971) (Court set forth guidelines to assist courts in "grappl[ing]
with the flinty, intractable realities of the day-to-day implementation of those constitutional

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 65:467

is limited by the separation of powers doctrine.1 2 Although it is
emphatically the role of the judiciary to determine whether the
constitutional mandate has been satisfied, the judiciary simply
cannot command enactment of specific legislation to ensure that
schools possess the wherewithal to implement improvements.103
The judiciary is limited to setting forth the standards, criteria, and
goals with which the legislature must comply. 10 4 Consequently, a

commitment to higher quality education must involve a long-term
relationship between the judiciary and legislature
to address the
05
multitude of issues which will continue to arise.1
The New Jersey experience illustrates the dynamics of this vital relationship. 1 6 In deciding Abbott, the New Jersey Supreme
commands"); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968) (ordering school districts "to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary, system in which
racial discrimination would be eliminated root and branch"). Most recently, in Missouri v.
Jenkins, 110 S. Ct. 1651 (1990), the Court upheld the power of a federal district court to
order a tax increase to fund desegregation. Id. at 1666. However, in line with Reverend
Hesburgh's view that creative leadership in addition to judicial activism is necessary to promote social change, despite the proactive stance of the judiciary, the progress made toward
the goal of desegregation can be evaluated at best as a mixed success. See Book Note, 90
COLUM. L. REv. 601, 602 (1990) (reviewing K. Karst, Belonging to America: Equal Citizenship and the Constitution (1990) (finding Brown "epitomizes the 'process' of teaching
equality," yet noting lack of total success)).
202 See Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Study in JudicialSelf-Legitimization, 8 RUT.CAM. L.J. 508, 521-24 (1977) (purpose of separation of powers doctrine is primarily to protect "against the accumulation of tyrannical power by any one branch of government").
103 See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 304, 575 A.2d at 367 (legislature's role in education is fundamental and primary, while court's function is limited to constitutional review); Rose, 790
S.W.2d at 213-14 (recognizing difference between enacting specific legislation, which is role
of legislature, and establishing criteria, standards, and goals, which is function of court);
Helena, 236 Mont. at 55, 769 P.2d at 691 (allocation of funds within control of legislature);
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 397-98 (legislative responsibility to appropriate revenues to satisfy
constitutional mandate).
1I

See supra note 102.

See Johnson, supra note 1, at 327. Johnson recognized that if the judicial decision is
in opposition to the legislature's agenda, then the court either will have to acquiesce to the
legislature or continually review the legislative enactments until they satisfy the constitutional mandate. Id.
0 See Note, Equal Educational Opportunity Revisited: Abbott v. Burke and the
"Thorough and Efficient" Law in New Jersey, 40 RUTGERS L. REv. 193, 205-13 (1987).
The 1973 Robinson I decision marked the beginning of a judicial commitment to education in New Jersey. Id. Robinson I was followed by Robinson v. Cahill, 63 N.J. 196, 306 A.2d
65 ("Robinson II"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) and Robinson v. Cahill, 67 N.J. 35, 335
A.2d 6 (1975) ("Robinson'II'),where in both instances the court was forced to extend the
deadline for the implementation of legislative action in response to Robinson L See Robinson II, 63 N.J. at 198, 306 A.2d at 66, and Robinson III, 67 N.J. at 36-37, 335 A.2d at 6-7.
The extensions were needed because Robinson I "had not been greeted with either popular
or legislative approval." See Note, supra, at 209. In Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 133, 155, 351
105
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Court was in the unique position of evaluating the constitutionality of an "educational funding system specifically designed to conform to a prior court decision. 1 0 7 The conclusion that the system,
which was enacted in response to Robinson I, actually resulted in
increased disparities'0 8 strongly indicates that judicial decisions
alone will not solve the problems causing inadequate public education.10 9 However, the message is clear that, eighteen years after
Robinson I, the New Jersey Supreme Court intends to remain
involved." 0
The holding and remedy devised by the Abbott court were also
unique." Unlike the other state high courts which almost invariably had struck down the financing systems in total, 12 the Abbott
court found that the system was unconstitutional only as to the
A.2d 713, 724 ("Robinson IV'), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975), the court reaffirmed its
commitment to equality of education by requiring that certain types of state aid be distributed in accordance with an equalization formula. Id. In 1975, the New Jersey Legislature
enacted the 1975 School Education Finance Act ("the Act"), N.J. STAT ANN. §§ 18A:7A-1 to
18A:7A-33 (West. Supp. 1987), and in 1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court found the Act to
be facially constitutional in Robinson v. Cahill, 69 N.J. 449, 467, 355 A.2d 129, 139 (1976)
("Robinson V"'). See Note supra, at 210-11.
The Act focused on elements of substantive education, incorporating a list of educational goals binding on all districts. See id. The court validated the financing scheme despite
the disparities in funding which remained. Id. at 211. The court, however, made clear that
"only actual operation would reveal whether the law would provide sufficient funds to meet
the constitutional mandate." Id. Foreshadowing the Abbott litigation, Judge Conford's dissenting opinion expressed serious doubt that this system which claimed to provide equal
substantive educational opportunity, but was heavily dependent on local property taxes,
could possibly succeed. See id. at 211-12.
107 Abbott, 119 N.J. at 315, 575 A.2d at 373.
1os See id. at 334, 575 A.2d at 382. The disparity in per pupil expenditure between the
highest and lowest districts was $800 before the enactment of the Act for the academic year
1971-72. Id. By the years 1984 and 1985, the disparity had grown to an average of $2,861 per
pupil. Id. at 335, 575 A.2d at 383.
109 See id. at 304, 575 A.2d at 367. The court recognized in public school reform litigation that "confrontation between the branches of government is not only a distinct possibility but has been an unfortunate reality." Id.
11oSee Williams, With Abbott Justices in for the Long Haul, 125 N.J.L.J. 1664, 1664
(June 21, 1990).
" See Tractenberg, A ConstitutionalCommitment to Education, 125 N.J.L.J. 1664,
1664 (June 21, 1990). The focus in Abbott was "narrower and deeper than other schoolfinance reform decisions." Id. Despite an elaborate record of data addressing districts on a
statewide basis, the court fashioned a remedy only addressing the 28 poorest districts. Id.
Tractenberg suggests that this narrow focus was an attempt by the court to reach out to the
most "compelling unconstitutionality." Id. Mindful of the ineffectiveness of the Robinson I
decision on the quality of education in the state, the court became more focused on the
poor. Id.
112 See Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 215; Helena, 236 Mont. at 55-56, 769 P.2d at 690;
Edgewood, 777 S.W.2d at 399.
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poorer urban school districts."1 " The remedy the court provided
was an order that funding made available to the poorer urban districts be substantially equivalent to the funding available to the
wealthiest districts.11 4 The court recognized that its decision represented only an initial step in public school reform1 15 and that much
experimentation would be needed to improve the public education
system.1 16 Increased funding was deemed essential to such
117
experimentation.
The future of school reform in New Jersey will largely depend
upon legislative action taken in response to the court's ruling. 1 '
Approximately two weeks after the Abbott decision, the New
Jersey legislature passed the Quality Education Act ("the Act").119
By the 1996 academic year, the Act provides for an additional one
billion dollars per year to the state's thirty poorest school districts.12 The Act actually exceeded the mandate of the judicial order by also providing increased financial support to over three
hundred districts which were not specifically addressed in the Abbott decision.1 21 While increasing aid to these districts, the Act requires a reduction in funding available to 232 of the state's wealthier districts.' 2 2 The primary source of the funding will come from
"I See Abbott, 119 N.J. at 384, 575 A.2d at 408 (constitutional failure was "clear, severe, extensive, and of long duration").
14 See id. The determination of which districts were to be classified as the "poorer
urban districts" was left to the legislature. Id. at 385, 575 A.2d at 409. The means of implementing the remedy was also left to the legislature, but the court proposed options including
revamping the entire system, phasing in a new system while phasing out the old, or equalizing funding statewide. Id. at 387, 575 A.2d at 409.
11 See id. at 374-75, 575 A.2d at 403. The court stated:
We realize our remedy here may fail to achieve the constitutional object, that no
amount of money may be able to erase the impact of the socioeconomic factors
that define and cause these pupils' disadvantages. We realize that perhaps nothing
short of substantial social and economic change affecting housing, employment,
child care, taxation, [and] welfare will make the difference for these students; and
that this kind of change is far beyond the power or responsibility of school districts. We have concluded, however, that even if not a cure, money will help, and
that these students are constitutionally entitled to that help.
Id.
le See id. at 366 n.30, 575 A.2d at 398 n.30.
117See id.
118 See id. at 385-88, 575 A.2d at 408-09.
119 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:7D (1990).
120 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1990, at B2, col. 3.
121 Id.
122 Id.
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substantial increases in New Jersey's income and sales tax. 123 Following passage of the Act, it, along with the Governor and Democrat-controlled legislature, have been the subject of much criticism
in New Jersey. 24 In response to political pressures, 25 the legislature has significantly altered the original school-aid program provided for by the Act.'26 The primary change involves shifting $360
million in the form of property-tax relief for middle-income homeowners from the one billion dollars originally allotted to schoolaid.127 Thus, the conflicting interests of a legislature and Governor
seeking to appease voters and simultaneously achieve "world
class"' 28 education demonstrate the complex political realities as123 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1990, § 1, at 23, col. 2.
212See id. The Quality Education Act cleared both the General Assembly and Senate

by 41-33 and 21-17 margins, respectively. Id.
The reactions of New Jersey citizens are as volatile as the slim margins by which the
Act passed would suggest. For instance, superintendents of some of the wealthier districts
who suffer a reduction of funds under the Act, have organized to attack the new legislation.
See id. Teachers' associations fear negative impacts from the Act resulting in lower salaries.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 6, 1990, at B3, col. 1. The New Jersey Education Association reported
that of 101 unsettled contracts, 86 are at an impasse. Id. Stalled negotiations were consuming the efforts of 60 mediators as of the first day of school. Id. The troubled negotiations are
due in large part to "paranoia" concerning the implications of the Act with respect to wages
for teachers, custodians, secretaries, bus drivers, and nurses. Id.
Elderly people also claim adverse effects from the Act. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1990, §
12, at 1, col. 5. The American Association of Retired Persons has waged an attack alleging
that the loss of aid to the wealthier districts will have a ruinous effect on elderly people with
low incomes living in the wealthy district. Id.
125 See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1991, § 12 (NJ), at 1, col. 1 (Act "blamed for nearly dooming Senator Bill Bradley's re-election"); N.Y. Times, Jan 13, 1991, § 14, at 6, col. 1 (suggesting future of New Jersey Democrats depends on revision of Act); N.Y. Times, Nov. 20,
1990, at B6, col. 1 (Democrats facing re-election "skittish" about supporting Governor's
school-aid plan).
M See N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at B3, col. 1 (legislature votes to revise school-aid
plan). This vote was the culmination of efforts of a task force specifically formed to review
the law and make changes, and of pressure from legislative leaders opposed to the plan. See
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1991, at B2, col. 5 (speaker of New Jersey Assembily proposes plan to
shift funds from school-aid to property tax relief for homeowners); N.Y. Times, Jan. 27,
1991, § 12 (NJ), at 1, col. 1 (implementation of Act uncertain "because of disagreements
between the Governor and legislative leaders"); N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1991, § 4, at 6, col. 1
(Governor's tax and school-aid plan characterized as "political disaster"); N.Y. Times, Nov.
20, 1990, at B6, col. 1 (Governor appoints outside panel to review plan).
127 N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1991, at B3, col. 1.
128 See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1990, at B2, col. 3. Education Commissioner John Ellis
has developed a Division of Urban Education consisting of teams of business and education
specialists who will assess the current status of the property poor districts and monitor their
progress. Id. Ellis has set his goal at establishing "world-class" education for all New Jersey
pupils. N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1990, § 1, at 23, col. 2; see also N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1991, § 12
(NJ), at 1, col. 1 (Governor's Quality Education Commission begins work on "major over-
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sociated with the implementation of so controversial a law.
This situation may foreshadow the problems which other
states whose courts have intervened in public school financing can
expect in the future. 12 9 The New Jersey experience would appear
to suggest that if the ideals of educational equality are going to
extend beyond the courtroom and actually effectuate change, it
will take commitment from society and the legislature, as well as
from the courts.
CONCLUSION

The future offers much hope for public school financing reform. Following two decades of judicial ambivalence in this area,
four state high courts within sixteen months have found public
school funding systems based largely on local property taxes to be
constitutionally invalid. Although these decisions have offered no
new legal theories on the issue of the constitutionality of local
property tax funding systems, they have provided renewed momentum to a judiciary previously inactive in this area. Regardless
of judicial participation, however, questions remain as to whether
public education in the United States will improve. It is clear at
this point that it will take more than judicial activism to achieve a
higher quality of public education. Equally committed state legislatures willing to revamp funding systems in accordance with judihaul" on public education system).
129 Richards, Education Tax Hikes are Easy, Higher School Standards Hard, 125
N.J.L.J. 1663 (June 21, 1990). The Texas Legislature has acted in response to the Edgewood
decision. See id. The Texas Legislature's response was not as dramatic as the New Jersey
response. The legislature increased the sales tax to generate an extra $550 million in revenues for the property-poor districts. Id. The system is essentially a "repetition of the old
unconstitutional scheme at higher levels of guaranteed funding for poor districts." Id. This
response was a deficient answer to the court's ruling. Id. For instance, there was no provision for the funding of new facilities and the ability of wealthy districts to tax at low rates
and achieve high funding remains unchanged. Id. Such an inadequate response by the legislature suggests the probability of "decades of litigation comparable to the New Jersey experience." Id.
The Kentucky Legislature also passed a significant tax increase in response to the Rose
decision. The General Assembly reacted immediately to the decision and appointed a task
force to study the education system. See Dawahare, 125 N.J.L.J. 1665 (June 21, 1990). The
task force studied the situation and proposed reforms, and on April 11, 1990, the Kentucky
Education Reform Act of 1990 was passed. Id. Overall, the plaintiffs in Rose appear pleased
with the new legislation, but as in all states addressing this issue, time will tell if more
money will make a difference in educational quality. Id.
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cial orders and dedicate resources are also an integral part of the
solution to this complex social problem.
Tricia E. Bevelock

